Dissertations and Theses
Fall 2011

Integration of Unmanned Aerial Systems in Class E Airspace: The
Effect on Air Traffic Controller Workload
Jeeja S. Vengal
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University - Daytona Beach

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/edt
Part of the Aviation Safety and Security Commons, and the Multi-Vehicle Systems and Air Traffic
Control Commons

Scholarly Commons Citation
Vengal, Jeeja S., "Integration of Unmanned Aerial Systems in Class E Airspace: The Effect on Air Traffic
Controller Workload" (2011). Dissertations and Theses. 143.
https://commons.erau.edu/edt/143

This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact commons@erau.edu.

Integration of Unmanned Aerial Systems in Class E Airspace:
The Effect on Air Traffic Controller Workload

by
JEEJA S. VENGAL
B.S., Purdue University, 2004

A Thesis Submitted to the
Department of Human Factors & Systems
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Human Factors & Systems

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Daytona Beach, Florida
Fall 2011

iii

ABSTRACT
As technology rapidly advances and our imagination is no longer fantasy but
instead reality, the aviation community needs to concentrate on the harsh truth of airspace
safety. In the situation of integrating unmanned aerial systems (UASs) into the National
airspace, UASs outside of terminal areas would generally be permitted to fly their
preferred routes, and self-separate, with minimal intervention from air traffic control.
From an air traffic control perspective, the integration could raise a number of human
performance problems including workload extremes and passive-monitoring demands.
One fundamental requirement for operation in the National Air Space is to preserve the
safety of the general public. This paper describes an experimental evaluation of the
effect different levels of UAS intent information has on air traffic controller workload.
The simulation specifically manipulates intent sharing, that is, whether unmanned aerial
vehicles provided advance notice of their intended maneuvers. The Effects on air traffic
controller workload when control capability is altered were also explored.
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Introduction
As technology rapidly advances and our imagination grazes closer and closer to
reality, the aviation community needs to concentrate on the truth of airspace safety. The
history of unmanned aircraft started soon after the first manned flight. Efforts to merge
the novel technologies of aerodynamics, light-weight engines, and radios resulted in live
experiments of unmanned aircraft on both the European and North American continents
(Kumar, 1997). During the early days of aviation, the numbers of aircraft populating the
skies rapidly increased, leading to a need for ground-based control of aircraft. In 1926,
the United States developed its own set of air traffic rules after the passage of the Air
Commerce Act (Komons, 1978). This legislation authorized the Department of
Commerce to establish a set of common sense air traffic rules and provided for the
registration, certification, and inspection of aircraft and the licensing of pilots and
aviation mechanics (Komons, 1978). These regulations laid down rules for the
navigation, protection, and identification of aircraft, including rules as to safe altitudes of
flight and rules for the prevention of collisions between aircraft. The Air Commerce Act
of 1926 introduced the basis of what is known today as Air Traffic Control (ATC). As
traffic increased, revisions were made so that general rules were more stringent to prevent
the increasing numbers of collisions. To date, the safety of our airspace relies on our air
traffic controllers (ATCos), their mission being to maintain safe separation of all aircraft.
For several years, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) involving flying vehicles without
pilots present have been in our skies but have not proven to be a huge concern. As time
passes, the curiosity and infatuation of UASs will grow due to their recent military

deployment successes and will raise awareness of UASs and verify their operational
potential.
Currently, there are an ever-increasing number of UASs present in controlled
airspace. Although unmanned aircraft systems have proven beneficial for the United
States military, circumstances have arisen in which unmanned aircraft systems have come
into conflict with air traffic (Newcome, 2004). This draws huge concern in terms of
ATCo workload and overall safety and efficiency of the air traffic system. With UASs in
the sky, traffic density increases and the aircraft flight characteristics become even more
diverse. The overall dynamics of the airspace makes it difficult for the controller to
maneuver other aircraft due to changes in traffic flow and airspace complexity. It has
been predicted that increases in traffic complexity will increase the controller’s workload
(Wickens, Mavor, McGee & Parasuraman, 1997, 1998). Technologies and procedures
must be created to harmonize the operation of UASs with the operation of civilian aircraft
(Blazakis, 2004). One fundamental requirement for operation in the National Air Space
(NAS) is to preserve the safety of the general public, since, it is the responsibility of
ATCos to maintain safe separation of aircraft, they cannot be bombarded by additional
tasks which could adversely affect the NAS. To ensure this safety, specifically, the
impact of the integration of UAS in the NAS on air traffic controller workload needs to
be thoroughly investigated.
Pressures from military operations and the UAS industry have increased to
incorporate unmanned aircraft systems into controlled airspace (Newcome, 2004).
However, it is important to transport these systems through the national airspace system
safely and efficiently. To guarantee safety of the general public, it is essential to
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recognize the influence alterations in system procedures can have on the operators of that
specific system. This proactive approach leads to the development of procedures, which
maximize system benefits (in terms of safety and cost), yet sustain minimal physical and
mental responsibility for the controller (Pawlak, Brinton, Crouch & Lancaster, 1996).
Additionally, it is imperative to provide the ATCos with more reliable and powerful
equipment than ever before to ensure successful air space control and flow. In particular,
to maintain current air traffic management standards the aviation industry needs to
determine how to keep air traffic controller workload to a minimum and make sure the
addition of UASs does not considerably affect their level of workload. The overall
design of the new control system for the human operator should take into consideration
human strengths and vulnerabilities. The identification of these strengths and weaknesses
will indicate the appropriate equipment necessary to facilitate safe and efficient
integration of UASs into the NAS.
Therefore, the implications of UAS intent information on ATC workload should
be examined based upon the requirement to operate at an equivalent level of safety, as
defined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

The availability of intent

information is when the ATCo is informed of the proposed direction of the aircraft. The
purpose of this paper is to identify the effects of the integration of UASs on ATC when
manipulating UAS intent information and ATC control capabilities.
Unmanned aerial systems
“The NAS is expected to change significantly over the next 16 years with the
introductions of new technologies and procedures. Many of these changes will be
motivated by increasing demand in the number and diversity of systems users, including
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the addition of unmanned aerial vehicles” (DeGarmo, Nelson, 2004). The aviation
community must be prepared for these changes. UASs (a term created by the US
Military) are the latest generation of pilotless aircraft employing the most sophisticated
remote control technology on the planet. ‘Pilotless’ can imply a remotely located pilot or
no pilot at all, as the system is entirely self-autonomous (United States Department of
Defense, 2001). Taken literally, UAS could describe nearly anything from kites, radiocontrolled aircraft, to cruise missiles, so it’s imperative to note the distinction between
unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In relation to
the military, the term UAS is confined to reusable ‘heavier-than-air’ machines. The term
unmanned aircraft system includes the entire weapon system that the Department of
Defense has historically referred to as UAVs. In general, the terms UAS and UAV can
be used synonomously, however the term UAS is more common than UAV
(Weatherington, 2005). Unmanned aircraft systems are, in essence, remote-controlled
aircraft, but are different and more sophisticated (United States Department of Defense,
2001). Interest in such machines has grown within the higher priorities of the US
military, as they offer the possibility of cheaper weapons with great strike potential that
can be used without risk to aircrews. Although these vehicles are unmanned, there is still
an operator responsible for the flight of these systems. The operator’s responsibility is to
define destination points in the sky, while the system autonomously decides how to
change and dynamically adjust its flight profile in-flight to get to those points.
While the predominance of UASs have been confined to military use in recent
years, UASs also fill a vital and emergent role in the civilian aviation industry. Many
jobs being performed by manned aircraft are dangerous, tedious, physically demanding or
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incredibly expensive. “It has been estimated that over the past five years, on average,
eight deaths have occurred annually in the geophysical survey industry, where pilots fly
their instrumented aircraft over long routes, close to the ground, and over severe terrain”
(Bargainer, Knuppel & Ogden, 2000). In many of these low altitude scenarios, the
outcome is ultimately crashing into the low terrain. This type of accident is termed
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT), thus in the majority of cases no mechanical
failures cause the crash. These jobs, which entail such strenuous and complicated
maneuvers, which lead to CFIT accidents, can be replaced with UASs as opposed to
piloted aircraft. UASs eliminate the threat of death and/or harm to any pilot, as none are
physically required to be present. UASs give researchers the ability to obtain information
in dangerous regions or go places that man is physically incapable of going. For
example, an UAS was an invaluable asset during Hurricane Ophelia, a storm that formed
off the East Coast of the United States for several weeks in 2005. The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), and Aerosonde North America collaborated and ventured on an
unprecedented mission in hurricane surveillance history. On September 16 an unmanned
aircraft flew into winds over 80 mph. “The aircraft, known as an Aerosonde, provided the
first ever detailed observations of the near-surface, high wind hurricane environment, and
an area often too dangerous for manned aircraft to observe directly” (Koehler, 2005).
The observations taken by UASs made unknown information about hurricanes accessible
to researchers and may lead to due diligence for future natural disasters. In addition, the
development and use of UASs will enhance current methods of reconnaissance for the
United States government in several departments, such as The Department of Homeland

5

Security (DHS) and The Department of Transportation (DoT). The UASs are capable of
such roles as border security, coast guard and maritime missions, transportation security
and protection of critical infrastructure (Weatherington, 2005). Therefore, the use of
UASs is beneficial and a solution which can reduce the number of accidents and negative
incidents within the aviation industry.
However, the benefits of UAS use draw a subsidiary concern. The wide range of
military UASs in controlled airspace threaten safety worldwide, as Air Traffic Control
has magnified the issue of UASs in controlled airspace. This concern was first raised
when UASs caused severe air traffic control problems in Bosnia and Kosovo due to that
country’s primitive altitude sensing system. The mishap occurred because the UASs that
were flying in European airspace did not supply air traffic controllers with sufficient
positioning information. This information is becoming particularly important in Europe
as larger UASs are introduced to the military, multiplying air traffic, and in turn crowding
available air space. Furthermore, the limitations on other equipment designed within the
UAS have made it difficult to work safely within civilian airspace (Butterworth-Hayes,
2001). More specifically, the Globalhawk (a type of UAS) requires a variety of levels of
airspace to perform its duties. The dynamic in airspace, when a UAS is present, makes it
difficult for air traffic controllers to safely organize the airspace. A typical UAS climbs
at an extremely slow rate in comparison to civilian aircraft, and a slow moving UAS
across the sky is an obstacle that ATC has to direct traffic around (McCarley & Wickens,
2005). In view of that fact, a focus on the UAS ascent and descent will identify ATC
human factors related aspects. The incursions in civilian controlled airspace due to
uninhabited vehicles in Europe have shown that more awareness of how to incorporate
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UASs in the NAS safely is essential in this sector of aviation. There is a justified need
for UASs; however, there is an even greater need to incorporate this futuristic technology
safely. Specifically, the aviation industry needs to look at UAS equipment and the
authority of air traffic control, which will have an effect on overall cohesiveness in
civilian airspace. UAS equipment can vary depending on the type of UAS in question.
Each UAS has distinctive specifications and abilities, and it is vital to decipher these
differences among the myriad types of UASs to choose the specific vehicles for this
study.
Types of unmanned aerial systems. It is important to distinguish that the label
“Unmanned aircraft systems” can be applied to an expansive range of vehicle types,
configurations and sizes. The slow pace and long haul characteristics of UASs are the
features that trigger the Federal Aviation Administration’s curiosity of their effects on
systematically coordinating the controlled airspace. This wide spectrum of vehicles is
illustrated in Appendix A, where several current UASs are pictured, along with their
locations on a logarithmic mass scale (Weibel & Hansman, 2004).
The Predator and Global Hawk are examples of unmanned aircraft systems that
are most regularly used within the NAS. The most commonly used UAS in the United
States military is the Predator because of its small size. The Predator weighs about as
much as a small private airplane, such as a Cessna 172 (Sweetman, 1997-2005). The
Predator is a medium-altitude UAS that has long endurance and broad coverage area. It
has been used operationally since 1994 and has been deployed continuously providing
assistance during the ordeals in Kosovo. It cruises at speeds of 100 to 200 knots, at an
altitude up to 26,000 feet and can go on missions as long as 24 hours (DoD Press Brief,
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2001). Furthermore, the Predator can take off and land by the hardware and software
built within. The largest UAS in use today is the Global Hawk. Similar to the Predator,
the Global Hawk is a high-altitude system and is preprogrammed for destinations. With
one command the UAS can take off, perform its mission and return and land accurately
without further human intervention. The main concern lies in accountability of the
remote pilot in receiving and returning messages from ATC (Newcome, 2004). It cruises
at speeds of 340 knots at altitudes up to 65,000 feet and can go on missions as long as 40
hours (DoD Press Brief, 2001). The specifications of the Predator and Global hawk
drastically differ to civilian aircraft. A commercial aircraft can cruise at speeds of up to
460 knots. The choice of UAS to be used in this study is based on altitude, weight and
speed. They vary in weight and reach high altitudes, which adequately interfere with
normal air traffic similar to that of a real situation.
In general, the command and control of both the Predator and Global Hawk is
completed by systems developed by their manufacturer, General Atomics Aeronautical
Systems and Northrop Grumman, respectively. The United States Air Force has
committed to elevated assembly rates of the Predator and Global Hawk because of its
promising operational needs. In turn, the Predator and Global Hawk compared with other
UASs will be prominent and have an increased chance of implementation in the NAS,
which may affect air traffic control. The heightened demand for these craft has increased
interest of the impact they will have in the NAS. There is a growing interest to find ways
of allowing UASs and civilian air traffic to peacefully co-exist. However, prior to the
intervention of UASs air traffic controllers mastered the method of keeping the NAS safe.
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Therefore, it is important to explore the ATC arrangement and the changes that occur on
air traffic controllers when UASs enter the equation.
Air Traffic Control
The role of an air traffic controller is extensive, stressful and strategic. The
country’s air traffic control system is accountable for managing a complete blend of air
traffic from commercial, general, corporate, and military aviation. The principal task is
to maintain separation between aircraft. Air traffic controllers accomplish this task by
using aircraft and airspace information, and other available resources to successfully
control and calculate prospective conflicts, which jeopardize this separation. It is the
responsibility of the air traffic controllers to keep the airspace safe and efficient. The
aviation community still has many obstacles to overcome to assure the growing demand
of UASs is met. The existing stress and strain of air traffic controllers needs to be
assessed. This investigation will lead to the discovery of regulations and qualifications of
unmanned aircraft systems so that a safe and integrated sky can exist. The goal is to
bring insight of what is necessary so that air traffic controller workload is minimized.
Intent Information.
For the purpose of this study, intent information can be more specifically defined
as automatic dependent surveillance–broadcast (ADS-B+) information provided to the
controller. As defined by the Federal Aviation Administration, ADS-B+ is when aircraft
(or other vehicles or obstacles) broadcast a message on a regular basis, which includes
their position (such as latitude, longitude and altitude), velocity, and possibly other
information. This broadcasted information is then relayed to ATCo so that they know
precise locations and future intents of aircraft within their airspace. Other aircraft or

9

systems can also receive this information for use in a wide variety of applications. This
study attempts to examine some of the human performance parameters (workload) that
may be associated with or without representation of ADS-B+ information. Under the
conditions in which there is an absence of ADS-B+ the controller will no longer know the
exact route that an UAS is expected to follow. Adding any variable to the ATC
environment could have an effect on overall observable and perceived workload (Wilson
& Flemming, 2002). However, adding unmanned aircraft systems; that can make
unanticipated maneuvers, create a variable the air traffic controller may not have any
control over and therefore could significantly affect each of the mental processes of
workload. The absence of intent information establishes uncertainty for the ATCo.
Therefore the ATCo will need to interrogate the UAS controller to obtain sufficient
information to manage the controlled airspace safely. Furthermore, if the ATCo wants to
mitigate this physical workload of interrogation by taking control of the UAS,
supplementary physical tasks would develop. The supplementary tasks include physical
manipulations to trajectory change points or flight levels. The amount of intent
information can either help or hinder ATC workload. If there is more sharing of UAS
intent information the better the trajectory model of the aircraft is for the ATCo. Thus,
there will be less communication and data entry tasks (physical) for the controller when
rearranging the airspace. On the contrary, reliance on intent information can also lead to
false conflict anticipations, mainly if trying to anticipate conflicts more than a few
minutes into the future (Yang & Kuchar, 1997).
In addition, the level of difficulty to control traffic, which includes UASs with no
ADS-B+, will most likely increase because the ATCo cannot predict UAS maneuvers.
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An investigation of ADS-B+ will lead to the understanding of the effects on ATCo
workload; however, this study will also investigate the affect on ATCo workload when
there are manipulations to action implementation. Basically, the effect when ATCo only
has the ability to control civilian aircraft and there are uncontrolled aircraft in the NAS.
Action implementation.
Action implementation can appropriately be defined as the physical action of
“control” in terms of the ATCo. The implementation of action denotes the ATCo has the
ability to take control of the UAS. The opposite holds true as well, when there is an
absence of the ability to implement action the ATCo cannot take control of the UAS.
When the air traffic controller has the ability to overtake the UAS they will and that is
due to the fact that they will have the ability to maneuver aircraft around the system
without hesitation. This is reaffirmed by the notion that when aircraft appear to be in
conflict it is much simpler for the ATCo to take control of the UAS and rearrange the
airspace rather than have extensive communication with the UAS controller to inquire on
their flight path and objective. This issue can only be examined meticulously with proper
test measures. The variables; change in intent information and change in control
capability need to be measured accurately. Furthermore, since the overall task of the
controller is dynamic the individual is undergoing several mental processes continuously
because they have to be vigilant to numerous aircraft. The continuous vigilance leads to
the phenomenon that occurs when the ATCo is processing multiple tasks. The processing
of multiple tasks can be better understood by defining dual task performance and single
resource theory. Therefore, it is important to analyze the current mental and physical
processes ATCos experience.
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Single Resource Theory
Humans are thought to process information via a single mode (Craik, 1947), a
theory that specifies that each person has a narrow processing capacity, with the
mechanisms required to perform tasks and mental activities in one band of resources
(Moray, 1967). This capacity could be dispersed in considerable amounts to various
activities depending on their difficulty or demand for resources. This concept
emphasizes the flexible characteristic of attention or processing resources, as all tasks and
mental activities share the same resources. Task demands increase either by making the
elements of the task more difficult or by imposing additional responsibilities
(DiDomenico, 2003). Thus, as task demands increase, the available resources may be
insufficient in balancing the additional resource demands. Consequently, limited
resources coincide with decreased task performance or increase in workload. The most
favorable situation is during single-task performance when all resources are devoted to
one task. Performing simultaneous tasks redirects resources from the original task to
another task and possibly degrades task performance. The variation in performance or
workload is determined by both the characteristics of the original task and any additional
task (DiDomenico, 2003). A task is data-limited if performance is maximized by the
quality of the data, not by the resources used (DiDomenico, 2003). On the other hand, if
performance is distorted with added or depleted resources, the task is resource-limited
(DiDomenico, 2003). This and similar theories assume that individuals have the ability
to adapt during multiple task situations and allocate resources between tasks.
Investigations of situations requiring the completion of parallel tasks have acknowledged
limitations to single-resource theory. The resources required to perform a task are
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partially determined by the difficulty of the task. Additional resources are required for
tasks of greater difficulty performed at the same level of efficiency. However,
interference between tasks is not merely determined by the difficulty of the tasks, but by
their composition (Wickens, 1984a).
Individuals have the ability to share their resources on multiple tasks. However,
in regards to air traffic control, the tasks of controlling the airspace all use the same
resources (Wickens, 1984). In regards to the study, there is no distinction of resources
when directing a UAS or civil aircraft. However, as explained previously the
performance of the workload will be affected if task demands are more difficult. The
following study varies the task demands by the changes the availability of UAS intent
information and ability to control the aircraft. The change in variables may require
additional resources or an increase in workload as suggested by the single resource
theory. This leads to the hypothesis that workload will increase when there is an absence
of intent information. This is due to the limited knowledge of the flight paths of UASs
which demand an increase in ATCo resources in order to maintain separation. The
understanding of the theories behind an individual’s ability to process tasks leads to the
discussion of workload management.
Dual Task Performance
Situations involving multi-tasking are to be expected in air traffic control, making
the issue of human performance being affected by multiple tasks simultaneously
incredibly relevant (Wicken & Gosney, 2003). Dual task performance is defined as
occurring when no physical limitations prevent two tasks from concurrent performance
yet limitations in cognitive processing still occur. Dual task performance can create a
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slowing in reaction times to stimuli in one task when another task is performed
simultaneously.
Dual task theory plays a significant role in relation to air traffic control. “Several
dual-task and multitask studies have shown that removing a task from the operators
control can benefit performance and workload if these requirements are met” (Wickens,
Mavor & McGee, 1997). This statement relates to the dual task of ATC overtaking
UASs when managing airspace. One aspect of this study concentrates on the effect the
ability to take control of UASs has on an ATCo. If the ATCo does not implement action
then workload and performance will benefit. This slight decrease in workload and
increase in performance is created because all of the ATCo’s attention is given to the
initial task. Furthermore, additional physical tasks would be eliminated because the
controller would not have to decipher and coordinate the UASs flight path. This
information cultivates the prediction that workload will decrease when the ATCo does
not have the ability to take control of the UAS. Similar to dual task theory, single
resource theory can provide an explanation for the mental and physical processes that an
ATCo experiences.
Workload
For at least 30 years, researchers have investigated the myriad facets surrounding
the relationship between humans and automation. Automation is becoming ubiquitous,
appearing in work environments as diverse as medical care, motor vehicle operation and
aviation. In essence, it is “technology that actively selects data, transforms information,
makes decisions, or controls processes” (Lee & See, 2004). UASs possess these
qualities, which introduce human factors concern for ATC trying to maintain separation.
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Therefore, a key concern that is often ignored is the human component involved in the
system. In aviation, a safety-critical domain, the interaction between humans and
automation needs to encompass several qualities to be optimal. By investigating and
accommodating the human mental and physical aspects involved within the interaction of
automation in UASs and ATC, propositions can be made which will lead the aviation
society to a better and more successful system. Currently, the human bears the burden of
excessive change, such as increases in ATCo workload.
Workload has been a topic of interest for researchers and psychologist worldwide.
Workload is one of the most noteworthy characteristics of the air traffic controller’s task
(Wickens, Mavor & McGee, 1997). While many factors augment the complexity of an
air traffic control situation, the impact of complexity on the controller can be dissected
under the requisites of both physical and mental workload. The changes that occur in the
airspace due to the addition of UASs can impact the ATCo physically and mentally. A
comprehensive analysis of air traffic control workload can only be accomplished if both
physical (objective) and mental (subjective) characteristics of demand on a controller are
noted (Cardosi & Murphy, 1995). The physical aspect includes elements in the ATC
environment which are visible or require physical manipulations that the controller has to
perform. On the other hand, mental workload is each controller’s individual experience
or subjective perception of the demands imposed by the ATC environment. A
controller’s mental processes are also heavily impacted by increased complexity,
therefore the argument is supported that measures of physical processes are not enough in
order to fully understand the complexity of ATC (Pawlak, Brinton, Crouch & Lancaster,
1996). Alternatively, mental workload can be defined as the amount of cognitive activity
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spent performing such tasks as the evaluating, planning, and monitoring of air traffic
control. Mental workload is not directly observable or measurable but must be inferred,
based on measures and observations of other elements. Both of these aspects of
workload can better be defined by sectioning workload as a whole into its individual
processes.
Currently, the air traffic controller’s job involves four main processes: planning,
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation (Pawlak, Brinton, Crouch, & Lancaster,
1996). It is important to investigate the individual processes to determine the level of
mental or physical workload each step entails. Throughout the ‘planning’ stage, the
controller’s ideal purpose is to determine the best course of action needed to resolve each
traffic conflict. In addition, the controller must also evaluate the impact of that decision
on the rest of the system. This stage is a mentally and physically challenging stage. The
ATCo is systematically organizing the airspace in manner that is logical for expeditious
and safe flow of traffic in the airspace. The ATCo physically inputs changes to aircraft
flight parameters (flight level, speed, heading, etc.). The ‘implementation’ stage, the
subsequent stage, is predominately physical although it does require some mental
processing. Once the controller has defined the appropriate actions, the plan established
in the first stage is implemented through a range of communication and data entry tasks
(physical). In addition, prior to physically typing, the controller is thinking about the best
manner in which to alter each aircraft (mental). After implementation, the controller
must proceed to the third stage of ‘monitoring’ the scenario to ensure it is in accordance
with the plan. The monitoring stage is considered to be predominantly mentally
challenging, as it requires the controller to mentally assess whether the pilot has followed
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earlier commands. Finally, the air traffic controller enters the last step of workload
processing, the ‘evaluation’ stage. The ATCo evaluates the effectiveness in resolving the
original conflict. This last step heavily relies on mental workload ability of the
controller. The diagram in Figure 1 is a visual representation of the ongoing mental
processes of an air traffic controller.

Figure 1. A Model of Air Traffic Control Activity (Pawlak, Brinton, Crouch &
Lancaster, 1996).
Many studies have been conducted to analyze the effect on air traffic control
workload when aircraft outside of terminal areas are free to fly user-preferred routes, and
modify their trajectories enroute, with minimal intervention by air traffic control
(Hilburn, Bakker, Pekela, & Parasuraman, 1997). Similar to the proposed study
researchers evaluated the effect on ATC when aircraft shared their intentions before
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maneuvering and scenarios without notification of intent (Hilburn, Bakker, Pekela, &
Parasuraman, 1997). The results deemed that under high traffic, controllers felt
significantly more workload when they controlled aircraft than they did when they didn’t
have control and were also uninformed of aircraft intent (Hilburn, Bakker, Pekela, &
Parasuraman, 1997). Furthermore, the controllers felt strongly that aircraft intentions
should always be available to the controller. The ADS-B+ allows controllers to make
better decisions because they have a better understanding of aircraft intentions and where
the airspace is free or congested. The ADS-B+ feature in the current study will assist the
air traffic controller in predicting confliction points before they occur. Visualization, the
process of using a visual mental model, is perhaps the most important cognitive function
the controller performs. Visual mental models are what we usually think of when we
speak of mental models- we “see” them in our “mind’s eye’ (Wickens, Mavor,
Parasuraman & McGee, 1998). Accordingly, it can be predicted that workload will
increase when the ADS-B+ is not made available to ATCo. Furthermore, it can be
predicted the controller workload will decrease when the level of UAS intent information
is at its highest meaning the ADS-B+ function in present. The lack of knowledge of
aircraft intent compels the controller to become more reactive to unnotified changes
causing them to overtake the uncontrolled aircraft (Wilson & Flemming, 2002). This
leads to the prediction that workload will increase when ATC has the ability to
implement action or take control of the UAS. Overall, studies indicate workload
reductions are greater for an ATCo when they cannot control the aircraft yet have access
to intent information rather than without intent information; that is, shared intent
information reduced controllers’ indicated workload (Hilburn, Bakker, Pekela, &
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Parasuraman, 1997). However, when the controller does have the ability to take control
of the aircraft and no intent information, workload will increase. The accurate testing
measures provide the proper evidence to verify or invalidate the hypotheses. This leads
to the discussion of workload measures.
Workload measures. Seeing as the definition of mental workload is multifaceted,
no distinct measurement technique can be expected to account for all the essential
features of human mental workload. A variety of methods are available to measure
workload based on the distinct approach and practical need in a particular scenario
(Tattersall & Foord, 1996). The three board categories of techniques are subjective
ratings, performance measures and physiological measures (Damos, 1991). As opposed
to physiological and performance measures, subjective measures offer a more simple and
succinct method of assessing workload. Well known subjective ratings scales include the
subjective workload assessment technique (SWAT), the NASA TLX, and the Modified
Cooper-Harper scale, which measure perceived workload after the task is completed
(Tattersall & Foord, 1996). Post-event subjective ratings tend to be skewed due to the
lapse in time between task completion and reporting task workload. The reduction in
stress due to task completion or lapse in time between task completion and workload
report may lead to a weaker participant rating of workload, as opposed to workload
reported during the simulation.
The following experiment measured workload with the use of an instantaneous
self-assessment to measure mental workload. Instantaneous self-assessment (ISA) is a
scheme that has been created as a measure of workload to provide immediate subjective
ratings of work demands during the performance of primary work tasks. According to
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researchers, ISA is found to be consistent with other workload measures. Subjective
ratings of the ISA were compared to mean heart rate, heart rate variability, and error in
the primary task of tracking in previous studies. Results showed that the ISA was
sensitive to the variations in task difficulty, as compared with levels indicated by the
physiological measures (Tattersall & Foord, 1996). The fundamental difference of the
ISA compared to other methods of workload measures is that it is possible to collect
time-based subjective ratings that are more clearly related to changing task demands.
Changes in task demand are a key aspect for air traffic controllers throughout the air
traffic control process. Thus, the ISA pinpoints high or low workload to its associated
task during the simulation (Tattersall & Foord, 1996).
Controller workload in the current study was assessed subjectively by requiring
inputs to an Instantaneous Subjective Assessment panel. The subjective information was
collected concurrently with an air traffic control task and although this may affect the
primary task, it was a better assessment of workload because of its ability to pinpoint
workload ratings during an ongoing task, rather than post task subjective ratings
(Tattersall & Foord, 1996). The mental workload was quantified subjectively from the
ISA. Accordingly, 5 minutes into the exercise and every 5 minutes after that, the
controller was prompted to indicate a “workload factor” rating from the ISA on the popup on-screen display. Furthermore, it is expected that the ISA did not cause interference.
It would only make a significant impact on ATCo performance or workload if the same
physical and mental processes required to controlling traffic were the same as those
required to answer the ISA. In the scheme of things, the ISA requires minimal effort.
The mental effort to answer the question on the panel is insignificant compared to the
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mental effort necessary for air traffic separation (Wickens, 1984). In addition, the ISA is
only displayed every 300 seconds, so it is not a constant obstruction.
In combination with the ISA, physical records of the ATCo were recorded with
the National Aviation Research Institute (NARI) simulator. The NARI simulation
collected objective data such as the number aircraft in the sector, the response time of
controllers to the ISA, the communication time between controllers and pilots, the
number of aircraft awaiting handoff, the time each controller took to accept handoffs and
the number of separation conflictions. Further information such as trajectory data, losses
of separation and observation were also collected. Trajectory data, which is the achieved
trajectory of each flight in the simulation, was recorded. This can be used to provide
information on the number of interventions and the efficiency of the achieved
trajectories. The system recorded exceptions where there were losses of separation
providing information on closest aircraft involved in the incident. These, in conjunction
with observation, may give some indication of the safety level of that simulation.
Controllers were monitored and transmissions were recorded to capture unusual events
that my not be seen in the other data. These data can provide an index into air traffic
controller physical workload.
By investigating and accommodating to the mental and physical aspects involved
within the interaction we can make developments which will lead the aviation society to a
better and more successful system. Workload is one of the most noteworthy
characteristics of the air traffic controller’s task and should be investigated to assess UAS
impact on air traffic controller workload.
Statement of Hypotheses
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In this report two scales will be utilized: one representing levels of automation
that can be applied to the dimension of UAS intent information and the other which is
related to the dimension of action implementation. The level of UAS intent information
is determined by the presence or absence of automatic dependent surveillance broadcast
(ADS-B+) information. The feature displays current path and the trajectory change
points of the UAS. The dimension of action implementation is simply if the controller
has the ability to take control of UASs in their sector of airspace. In regards to the
following study, a complete understanding of the effects of altering UAS intent
information and action implementation supplies insight to the make the following
hypotheses in relation to the overall affect on ATCo workload:
Hypothesis 1: ATCo workload will increase as the ability to influence UAS control
increases. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that a mental process occurs that
forces one task to wait for another. In addition, the same resources are needed for the
original mental process to control the UAS (single resource theory). Thus, the controller
needs to compensate for the relapse via extra mental or physical actions. In addition, this
hypothesis is reaffirmed by the notion that when aircraft appears to be in conflict it is
much simpler for the ATCo to take control of the UAS and rearrange the airspace rather
than have extensive communication with the UAS controller to inquire on their flight
path and objective.
Hypothesis 2: ATCo workload will decrease as UAS intent information increases. This
hypothesis is supported because the ADS-B+ information allows controllers to make
more accurate decisions because they have a better understanding of aircraft intentions
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and where the airspace is free or congested. Therefore unnecessary physical
manipulation or communication will diminish, in turn, reducing workload.
Hypothesis 3: ATCo workload will be highest when the ATCo has the ability to control
the UAS and cannot obtain UAS intent information compared to when the ATCo has the
ability to control the UAS and can acquire intent information. This hypothesis is
supported for the same reasons as in hypothesis 1. The ATCo will still have to inquire on
UAS intent information.
Hypothesis 4: ATCo workload will be lowest when the ATCo does not have the ability
to control the UASs and can acquire UAS intent information compared to when the
ATCo does not have the ability to control UASs and cannot obtain UAS intent
information. This hypothesis is supported because the ATCo will not be tempted to take
control of the UASs because they are incapable of doing so. Additionally, the ATCo
knows the intentions of the UAS, so they can direct the controlled aircraft appropriately
and efficiently as to avoid the UASs.
Method
Participants
The participants used were 10 Embry Riddle Aeronautical University’s (ERAU)
current air traffic control students. Each of the ATCos were randomly selected from
those enrolled in AT300, AT315 or AT400. These three courses were only offered to
students once they completed the prerequisites or were in their final year of the ERAU air
traffic control program. This assured they had a sufficient knowledge of air traffic
control rules and regulations. Using students in their final year eliminated the influence
of inexperience on actual ATCo workload. In addition, it was ideal the ATCo

23

participants had previous experience with the NARI simulation which reduced confusion
and the need for training. However, it was necessary to have all participants with the
same experience. Therefore, all of the participants must have had NARI experience.
This was so that their familiarity with the equipment wasn’t considered a confounding
variable.
Five male students and six female students volunteered from the ERAU air traffic
control courses. Participants had a mean age of 22.54 years, with a range of 19-26 of
years. All participants were informed about the experimental procedures and provided
written informed consent prior to participation. Several demographic and experience
level question were asked. The participants’ mean (SD) values for ATC lab time, number
of aircraft perceived to equal light workload, and number of air traffic courses taken were
121.36 hours, 17.45 aircraft, and 6 classes out of 8, respectively.
This study also required the use of pseudo pilots to control the aircraft. They are
coined ‘pseudo’ pilots because they followed a script to respond when set conflicts and
separation issues occur and therefore do not necessarily have official control of their
aircraft. The same pseudo pilots were used for each scenario. The pseudo pilots used
were experienced ERAU flight instructors. Using flight instructors was necessary
because they were familiar with the airspaces and normal operating procedures and
eliminated the need for training. Each pseudo pilot was responsible in this exercise for
communicating with the controller and taking instructions from the controller to fly the
aircraft. The UASs was controlled by a pseudo pilot to ensure the UASs were not
manipulated by the ATCo to do maneuvers the machine was incapable of performing.
The trajectory points are previously programmed in. However, the ATCo had the ability
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to contact the UAS controller (pseudo-pilot) and change its path. The ATCo would
change the path of the UAS by manipulating flight parameters (e.g.trajectory change
points, climb descent rate) to reduce the amount of airspace it would have originally
consumed. The UAS continued to its intended destination by means of its new flight
parameters. This was completed via the parameters of the simulator.
Both the ATC participants and pseudo pilots assisted the study on a voluntary
basis. The ATC student participants and ERAU instructor pilots all spoke English. This
was asked in order to deter discrepancies due to miscommunication. The ATCo student
participants all had passed the core ERAU ATC classes. The ERAU instructor pilots had
their FAA certified pilot license and were current with the medical and 24 month flight
review.
Apparatus
The NARI simulator created by ERAU- Air Traffic Management (ATM)
laboratories, the National Aviation Research Institute (NARI) and National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) was used. The system was designed to allow for
rapid prototyping of current and future Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON)
and Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) operations. This same system is used to
simulate the integration of unmanned aerial vehicles in the national air space by
researchers at the ERAU- ATM laboratory (Wilson & Flemming, 2002). The experiment
consisted of four different scenarios with alteration in the independent variables. During
this exercise the controllers controlled traffic in the Ocala sector, as seen in Appendix B.
The NARI simulator was designed using the Ocala sector because was the closest sector
to ERAU with a busy traffic pattern. Participant familiarity with the Ocala sector did not
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adversely affect the following experiment because all ATCos were aware of the locations
of the aircraft destination fixes. Destination fixes inform the controller of the aircraft’s
ultimate destination. Therefore, this knowledge informs the controller of what airspace
the craft needs to cross to get to the fix. This increases ATCo prediction accuracy of
where aircraft will be located. Traffic arrived and departed different routes from their
departure airfields to the arrival fixes and from the Orlando complex airfields to their
destinations. Each scenario was 30 minutes long and began with the first 10 minutes as a
low traffic sample, increased to high traffic level and then decreased back to low traffic
for the last 10 minutes. A low traffic sample consisted of 0-10 aircraft of which 1-3 were
UASs and a high traffic sample consisted of 10-20 aircraft of which 4-6 were UASs.
Approximately fifteen minutes into the simulation the participants encountered the
highest density level of traffic. The traffic then reduced in the last 10 minutes at a
comparable rate as it increased in the first 10 minutes. The scenario increased in number
of aircraft at a steady metered pace. Figure 2 shows a visual representation of the
variations in traffic over time.
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Figure 2. Traffic load over time
The density of the scenarios was based off of real traffic samples in Ocala with
the only new difference of the introduction of UASs. The mix of traffic consisted of a
combination of both civil aircraft and an equal number of the Predator UAS and the
GlobalHawks UAS. While, the scenarios were designed to be sufficiently different to
mitigate a “learning effect’, they were still similar enough such that the main difference
between scenarios was the presence of the intent display or ability of control for each
individual scenario. In order to accomplish this, the call signs were changed between
scenarios and the geometrical relationship between aircraft that were involved in conflicts
was altered. The change in call signs has shown to be enough of a modification to
eradicate the learning effect (Fleming, Lane & Corker, 2000). In each of the scenarios
the conflicts occurred in different locations of the sector. The unmanned aerial vehicles
used in the scenario (Predator and Global Hawk) flew at standard specified UAS speeds
(200-400kts) (DoD Press Brief, 2001). The controlled aircraft descended to the
Instrument Approach Fixes (IAFs) at their ‘preferred’ rate. Departing aircraft climbed
unrestricted on their preferred routes. The controller had complete regular
communication and control of the aircraft accordingly for safe separation. The mix of
traffic was thought to be representative of a normal scenario and also provided a
particularly challenging traffic mix for controllers (Hopkin, 1995).
Each scenario was equipped with an ISA response box. The purpose of this
response box was to establish a workload assessment as seen in Appendix C. It was
important for the participants to enter an accurate indicator of their subjective workload,
since it was the whole reason for carrying out these tests. Accordingly, 5 minutes into the
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exercise and every 5 minutes after, the ISA prompted the ATCo to indicate a “busyfactor” on prepared performance. The ISA was an on-radar-screen Likert Scale which
required the subject controller to enter a value ranging from 1 meaning: idle, 2 meaning:
low level work, 3 meaning: moderate work level (associated with normal operations), 4
meaning: constantly busy and 5 meaning totally occupied (no more tasks possible).
Supplementary workload data was gathered by measuring the length of time taken to
enter the workload response. This study collected physical data by an analysis tool,
contained in the NARI simulation, which measured sector complexity and the ability of
controllers to handle newly designed airspace through controller input and work station
analysis. At the end of the exercise the participant filled out a questionnaire about the
exercise. The questionnaire acquired post-experiment subjective data. This subjective
data included open-ended questions concerning traffic scenarios, conflicts, environment
and the experimental scenarios and then followed up with a likert scale question sheet on
workload contribution. In addition to the subjective questionnaire a demographic
questionnaire collecting information concerning the participants was used.
Design
This experiment was a 2 X 2 within subject, fully factorial design. All the
participants were briefed of their responsibilities before the start of the experiment. The
independent variables in this study were UAS intent information and UAS action
implementation. The first independent variable was the level of UAS intent information
or the amount of information provided in the display about the projected path of the
UAVs in the air space being controlled, as seen Appendix D. The second independent
variable in the study was the level of action implementation or the amount of control the

28

air traffic controller had over the UAVs in the scenario. Action implementation was
varied at two levels of no control of UAS and control of UAS. Figure 3 is a block
diagram displaying the different levels of the independent variables.
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Figure 3. Diagram of Independent Variables
UAS intent information had two levels that included the absence of intent
information and the presence of intent information. This study acquired two dependent
measures, mental and physical workload. Mental workload was assessed via ISA and
physical workload was assessed via the analysis tool contained in the NARI simulator
that included individual components of number of keystrokes, number of controller voice
communication, the number of handoffs, and the length of time for the controller to
respond to the ISA. All of the participants had the same experimental conditions for each
scenario. Therefore each participant was exposed to the same conditions.
Procedure
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Once the subjects arrived to the lab the purpose of the study was explained to
them. The participants were confined to the lab experimental area and were kept
unaware of the pseudo pilots as to preserve the notion of the “unmanned pilot’ in the case
of UASs. Both the participants and pseudo-pilots were provided with a set of
instructions, as seen in Appendix E and F. Both the participants and pseudo-pilots were
asked to sign a voluntary subject consent form, as seen in Appendix G and H. The
participants were asked to answer a demographic questionnaire just to collect background
information, as seen in Appendix I. Separately, the participants were briefed on their
obligations and all of their questions and concerns were addressed. Albeit, the pseudo
pilots served as assistants to the study they were also briefed and given a script to
familiarize themselves, to keep singularity for all the participants. The same pseudo
pilots were used for all of the scenarios. The ATCo participants were shown the ISA
prompt so that they were familiar with the subjective rating scale. Prior to actually
beginning the experiment, the participants sat through a scenario, which consisted of the
air traffic control sector with no changes to the independent variables. During the
experiment each of the participants saw all four scenarios. However, the order in which
they were delivered was randomized as to increase the internal validity of the experiment.
Each participant ran the ATC scenarios at one time, to eliminate surrounding distraction.
Soon after each scenario was completed, the ATCo participant filled out an additional
subjective questionnaire, as seen in Appendix J. This was a post experiment subjective
analysis, which was used in the case of misunderstandings that result from the actual
simulator. The ATCo were asked not to discuss the experiment with other participants
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until the testing was done. Contact information regarding the study was also distributed
in case the participants were curious of the results.

Data Analysis

Results
This experiment was a 2 X 2 within subject, fully factorial design. The
independent variables in this study were UAS intent information and UAS action
implementation. Three dependent variables were measured in this study; the
instantaneous self-assessment value, the reaction time necessary to respond to the ISA
and the number of physical inputs. The workload measures were collected in six
different rounds throughout each scenario. The data used in the analysis was taken from
the middle of each scenario. Specifically, the measures collected during the third round,
which was taken approximately 15 minutes into the simulation where the participants
encountered the highest density of level of traffic. The middle portion was selected
because if there were to be a difference in performance in the dependent measures it
would be most evident at this level of the simulation with high workload activity.
In addition, outliers can occur by chance in any distribution, but they are often
indicative of measurement error. The options are to discard them or use statistics that are
robust to outliers (Thorne & Giesen, 2003). In this case the removal of anomalous
observations from data through outlier detection would be best. The outliers were
removed because they were not found to be indicative of normal behavior and thus would
have disproportionate influence on the study. Outliers can have negative effects on
statistical analyses. First, they commonly contribute to increase error variance and
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reduce the power of statistical tests. Second, if deliberately distributed they can decrease
normality, altering the odds of making both Type I and Type II errors. Third, they can
bias or influence estimates that may be of practical interest. The presence of outliers can
lead to inflated error rates and substantial distortions of parameter and statistic estimates
when using either parametric or nonparametric tests (Zimmerman, 1994). The outliers
were extracted from the data, which was determined by converting raw data to z-scores,
which transformed the data into distance from the group mean in standard deviation
terms. Any data with a value that exceeded 3 or more standard deviations from the mean
was eliminated and in this study only one outlier was evident in the data. Distinctively,
time to respond to ISA category for one participant was discarded. The remaining means
and Standard Deviations for workload data are depicted in Figure 4.
D-Var iable
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Figure 4. Descriptive Statistics for Workload Data

2.91
3.80
36.91
3.09
3.55
30.27
3.09
4.64
28.18
3.09
19.36
41.36

.70
1.99
23.53
1.04
1.81
20.28
.83
2.38
12.24
.83
26.84
40.38

The data were analyzed using a two-way repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) to calculate the effects of intent information and action implementation on Air
traffic controller workload. Effects reported as significant in this experiment met a
criterion of α ≤ .05.
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There was a marginally significant main effect of intent information on reaction
time to ISA, F = 4.87, dF = 1, p = .055. An eta2 of .351 indicated that 35% of variability
in reaction time to ISA was caused by the absence or presence of intent information.
Observed power was .504. This study found that absence of intent information reduced
the time to react to ISA compared to when intent information was present.
There was a non-significant effect of action implementation on reaction time to
ISA, F = 3.56, dF = 1, p = .092. An eta2 of .284 indicated 28% of variability in reaction
time to ISA was caused by the ability to implement or not implement action. Observed
power was .393. This study found no effects of action implementation on time to react to
ISA.
This study found no effects of both intent information and action implementation
on time to react to ISA. There was a non- significant effect of the interaction of both
intent information and action implementation on reaction time to ISA, F = 3.207, dF =1,
p = .107. An eta2 of .263 indicated 26% of variability in the reaction time to ISA was
caused by the interaction effect. Observed power was .360.
The following graph (figure 5) shows intent vs. action implantation for reaction
time to ISA.
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Figure 5. UAS Intent and Control vs. based on Time to react to ISA
There was a non-significant main effect of intent information on ISA value, F =
.185, dF = 1, p = .676. An eta2 of .018 indicated 1.8% of variability in the ISA value was
caused by intent information. Observed power was .068. The study found no effects of
intent information on ISA value.
This study found no effects of action implementation on ISA value. There was a
non-significant effect of action implementation on ISA value, F = .092, dF = 1, p = .768.
An eta2 of .009 indicated .9% of variability in the ISA value was caused by action
implementation. Observed power was .059.
There was a non-significant effect of the interaction of both intent information
and action implementation on ISA value, F = .102, dF =1, p = .107. An eta2 of .010
indicated 1% of variability in the ISA value was caused by the interaction effect.
Observed power was .360. This study found no effects of both intent information and
action implementation on ISA value.
Figure 6 shows intent and action implementation for ISA value.
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Figure 6. UAS Intent and Control based on ISA Value
This study found no effects of intent information on the number of physical inputs. There
was a non-significant effect of intent information on the number of physical inputs, F =
.032, dF = 1, p = .861. An eta2 of .003 indicated .3% of variability in the number of
physical inputs was caused by intent information. Observed power was .053.
There was a non-significant effect of action implementation on the number of
physical inputs, F = .551, dF = 1, p = .475. An eta2 of .052 indicated 5.2% of variability
in the number of physical inputs was caused by action implementation. Observed power
was .103. This study found no effects of action implementation the number of physical
inputs.
This study found no effects of both intent information and action implementation
on number of physical inputs. There was a non-significant effect of the interaction of
both intent information and action implementation on ISA value, F = 1.29, dF =1, p =
.107. An eta2 of .114 indicated 1.4% of variability in the number of physical inputs was
caused by the interaction effect. Observed power was .360.
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The following graph (Figure 7) shows UAS intent and action implementation
based on the number of physical inputs.
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Figure 7. UAS Intent and Control based on the number of physical inputs

Discussion
This study set out to research the effect different levels of UAS intent information
had on air traffic controller workload as well as the effect when UAS control capabilities
(action implementation) were changed. Past research findings vary regarding the level of
UAS intent information and the level of action implementation. The results deemed in
most studies under high traffic, which involved both independent variables, was that
controllers felt significantly more workload when they controlled aircraft than they did
when they didn’t have control and were also uninformed of aircraft intent (Hilburn,
Bakker, Pekela, & Parasuraman, 1997).
When this study was initiated, the hypothesis was based on the accentuated
findings of the literature review. It was hypothesized ATCo workload would increase as
the ability to influence UAS control increased and the ATCo does not have intent

36

information. However, in this study, results did not prove that to be evident. There was
no significant difference in workload with the presence of UAS control and the lack of
intent information.
Subsequently, it was hypothesized ATCo workload would decrease as the ability
to influence UAS control decreased and the intent information increased. However, in
this study, results did not prove that to be evident. There was no significant difference in
workload with the absence of UAS control and the availability of intent information.
None of the dependent measures showed value of significance when altering the
independent measures. The lack of significance leads one to ask what the difference was
between this study and the aforementioned studies that suggested the line of thought for
the first two hypotheses. The most significant difference would be the participants. The
skill level of a veteran ATCo versus student controllers presents a varying ability to
control aircraft at different workload levels. Thus, the skills or experience level could
have caused a difference in the effect of the independent variables on workload. Previous
experience would provide the controller hindsight in times of turmoil. Therefore, the
controller may perceive a reduced intensity of workload. Vice versus, an amateur
controller may show signs of exaggerated perception of workload due to inexperience.
Additionally, although the scenario was comprised of aircraft, which constituted
moderate to high workload, the number of aircraft may have been underestimated to
decipher the slight variation in the independent variables. The final hypothesis, ATCo
workload would be lowest when the ATCo would not have the ability to control the
UASs but there was a presence of UAS intent information compared to when the ATCo
would not have the ability to control UASs but UAS intent information was absent, can
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also be argued by the our findings. The results revealed the contrary. The absence of
intent information creates less workload based on the time to respond to ISA. The
question then arises; how were the participants compensating for the lack of intent
information if they were not working harder to decipher intent? This hypothesis can both
be disproved by our results, which were found to have a significant effect. There was a
significant effect found on time to respond to ISA when there was an absence of intent
information and an absence of the ability to control UAS. Workload decreased when
there was a presence of both intent information and control. Although our significance
didn’t satisfy our significance criterion of α = .05. It can be supported by our observed
power, which proves to be of moderate value. Given that the observed power was only
moderate it means that the effect could have been strengthened most likely through
increasing the sample size and if that effect were strengthened then the difference would
most likely be found.
Perhaps some of the results of this study would have shown differently had we
adjusted for some limitations that were not anticipated. Primarily, there was low
feedback for workload in all four scenarios. Low feedback constitutes that the majority
of workload feedback levels selected by the participants were either average or below
average, more specifically a value of 1 (idle), 2 (low) or 3 (moderate). The data collected
showed that 33 out of 55 of the ISA responses were idle, low or moderate. One reason
behind this could have been exposed had there been a secondary task. The score or
involvement of this secondary task would have led to more insight. The participant could
have been inundated with mental processes that could not have been determined by the
three dependent measures; or on the contrary the participant could have successfully
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completed a secondary task. With this in mind, “secondary task methodology should be
the most intrusive of the major categories of techniques, since the capacity associated
with its uses should be substantial and would overlap temporarily with the demands of
the primary task. In fact, secondary task methodology has the potential to suffer not only
from such capacity interference, but also from so called peripheral interference, which
stems from physical input or output constraints” (Wickens, 1984). Hence, a secondary
task could have the ability to target or embellish the perceived levels of workload
creating a more accurate depiction of perceived worked due to the influence of the
independent variables.
Furthermore, the range of workload response was limited to a 5-point, Likert
scale. “Likert scale is also argued to contravene one of the important principles of
formulating an instrument: clarity and conciseness. That each Likert scale items
measures more than one dimension at a time is considered increasing cognitive
complexity, thus elevating measurement error (Hodge & Gillespie, 2003). With this is
mind; a 5-point scale may have made it difficult for the participant to pinpoint the exact
workload level. Especially, the third point, which participants may be confused for a
neutral position and was not a categorical value of workload (ie. high or low). This
neutral value may have skewed the data and consequently the results were inconclusive.
“Neither agree nor disagree” is confused with “don’t know” or “not available”
(Raaijmakers et. al., 2000).
Finally, effect of sample size on the power of the study could lead to skewed
results. Specifically, the larger the sample sizes the greater the power of the test will be.
The reason for this involves one of the properties of the sampling distributions of means:
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the larger and larger the sample size the sampling distribution becomes more and more
compact (Thorne & Giesen, 2003). Power in all of the results is considered to be of a low
value. The sample size was kept to ten participants due to the difficulty in finding fourth
year ATC students. Increasing our sample size could have had an effect on the results.
Future research could be quite helpful in findings ways to increase safety and
reduce air traffic controller workload. Before we can completely eliminate levels of high
workload we must define and establish the factors that increase workload and the
perception of workload. For example, there are various applications to measure workload
that could be presumably superior methods, but practical considerations limited pursuit of
those alternate methods. In addition, as stated earlier, a study incorporating a secondary
task may show significance. It compares to reality, in that, air traffic controllers
constantly complete secondary duties in addition to their chief responsibilities.

Conclusion
In conclusion, although the results of this study were not as hypothesized, they
were quite revealing of not only the mental process that occurs, but also the ability of a
human to adapt to change. The introduction of new technologies such as UASs into the
NAS may have an unanticipated but fundamental impact on controllers’ working
methods, strategies, and workload. Since a controller’s mental and physical processes are
heavily impacted by increased complexity, there is a need to investigate and determine
the origin and introduce methods to alleviate increased complexity. Studies such as this
one help us to understand more about the impact of UASs on the ATCo workload and
will show benefit to future inventions. It is vitally important to take note the effect of the
change in airspace dynamics has on ATCo workload to ensure expeditious handling of
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aircraft and that safety is never compromised.
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APPENDIX A
Spectrum of Current Unmanned aircraft systems
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APPENDIX B
Air traffic control screen of Ocala sector
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APPENDIX C
Air traffic control screen with instantaneous self assessment response box
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APPENDIX D
Air traffic control screen with intent information
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APPENDIX E
Air Traffic Controller Briefing and Instructions
Scenario
1. During this exercise you will be controlling traffic in the Ocala Sector. You should
use the control techniques and standard operating procedures that you are already
familiar with.
Traffic and routing
2. Traffic will arrive and follow current routing. Intensity will increase in three stages.
Each stage will last for approx 20 minutes. At the beginning traffic will build quickly
to approximate maximum of 6. After 20 minutes the rate will increase to 9 and for
the last stage the traffic will build to 12. Note that the actual number may vary
because of the way in which you control and sequence the aircraft. 3-5 unmanned
aerial vehicles will be present throughout the scenario. Your ability to take control of
the unmanned aerial vehicle and the amount of UAS intent information will differ
depending on the scenario.
Control Techniques
You should use normal control techniques and separation for this exercise. That is a
minimum of 5 nautical miles (nms) horizontal separation and 1000 ft vertical separation.
Handoffs to TRACON should be at least 5 nms in trail.
Workload Assessment
3. The purpose of this exercise is to establish a baseline workload assessment.
Accordingly, 5 minutes into the exercise and every 5 minutes after that you will be
prompted to indicate a “busyness factor” on the pop-up on-screen display
(Instantaneous Self Assessment). The factor ranges from 1 – 5 with 3 indicating a
normal comfortable level. 1 would indicate “doing nothing – all the time in the
world”; 5 would indicate “close to or actually at overload – I really have lost or am
close to losing this situation.”
4. Please be as accurate as you can in indicating your subjective workload experience.
5. At the end of each exercise you will be asked to fill out a questionnaire about the
exercise. As with the workload assessment, this is vitally important and will as part
of the human factors analysis.
ANY QUESTIONS?
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APPENDIX F
Pseudo Pilot for Aircraft and Unmanned aircraft systems Briefing and Instructions
1. You are responsible in this exercise for communicating with the controller and taking
instructions from the controller to “fly” the aircraft.
2. Your cue to make the initial call will be when you observe that the controller has
accepted handoff on a potential aircraft. YOU SHOULD NOT MAKE CONTACT
WITH THE CONTROLLER UNTIL HE/SHE HAS ACCEPTED THE HANDOFF
ANY QUESTIONS?
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APPENDIX G
Controller Consent Form
Purpose: This analysis effort has been requested by Jeeja S. Vengal, a graduate student
at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, to collect data for her thesis. The purpose of
this study is to identify the effects of the integration of unmanned aircraft systems on air
traffic controller performance.
Participant number: You will be randomly assigned a participant number. The number
will be used in organizing the data. Please write down and remember this number,
because it will be used again during the data collection activities.
Information Collected: The system will record performance information during the
experiment. This information collected you will give me, along with the information I
collect from other participants, will only be reported in the aggregate. There are no
known risks in participating in this study.
Waiver: Your “on-line” work in the simulated Ocala sector will be video taped and
audio-taped. By signing this from you give your consent to me to use your verbal
statements, and your “on-line” work, but not your name, for evaluation and
demonstration.
Confidentiality: Please understand that you participation in this study is strictly
voluntary and may withdraw from this study at any time. Your privacy will be protected.
Your participation in this study will be anonymous and will be held strictly confidential.
You may receive a copy of this consent form and/ or the final report on request. If there
are any questions or comments the experimenter, Jeeja S. Vengal, or Shawn Doherty
(Thesis committee Chair), can be contacted via email or phone.
Jeeja S. Vengal: jeeja26@hotmail.com or 216-225-6213.
Shawn Doherty: shawn.doherty@erau.edu or 386-226-6249
If you agree with these terms, please indicate your acceptance by signing below.
Signed____________________________________

Date________________________

Experimenter_______________________________ Date________________________
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APPENDIX H
Pseudo Pilot Consent Form
Purpose: This analysis effort has been requested by Jeeja S. Vengal, a graduate student
at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, to collect data for her thesis. The purpose of
this study is to identify the effects of the integration of unmanned aircraft systems on air
traffic controller workload when manipulating UAS intent information and ATC control
capability.
Waiver: Your communication with air traffic control in the scenarios will be video taped
and audio-taped. By signing this from you give your consent to me to use your verbal
statements, and your “on-line” work, but not your name, for evaluation and
demonstration.
Confidentiality: Please understand that you participation in this study is strictly
voluntary and may withdraw from this study at any time. Your privacy will be protected.
Your participation in this study will be anonymous and will be held strictly confidential.
You may receive a copy of this consent form and/ or the final report on request. If there
are any questions or comments the experimenter, Jeeja S. Vengal, or Shawn Doherty
(Thesis committee Chair), can be contacted via email or phone.
Jeeja S. Vengal: jeeja26@hotmail.com or 216-225-6213.
Shawn Doherty: shawn.doherty@erau.edu or 386-226-6249
If you agree with these terms, please indicate your acceptance by signing below.
Signed____________________________________

Date________________________

Experimenter_______________________________ Date___________________
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APPENDIX I
Participant Demographic Questionnaire
Name: ______________________________________________
Participant # _________________________________
Sex: M F
Age: _______________
Course Work Completed
Please check if you have completed these courses
Course

Title

Credits

AT 300
AT 305
AT 315
AT 401
AT 405
WX 201
One of the following is required
AS 120
AS 131

ATC in the National Airspace System
ATC Operations and Procedures
VFR Control Tower
Advanced Air traffic Control Operations
Air Traffic Management V
Meteorology I

3
3
3
3
3
3

Principles of Aeronautical Science
Commercial Flight Operations I
FAA Private Pilot Certificate

3
2
2

Estimated time in aircraft as Pilot/ Copilot:
Simulated/Labs: _________________________________hours
Real Time: _____________________________________hours
Estimated time in ATC lab: ________________________hours
During air traffic control Work,
1. What would you say is a general number of aircraft that would create a light workload
in a 20 minute shift? __________________________________________
2. If you were on shift with your combined experiences as of today, would you view this
number of aircraft as? ________________________
Light

Medium

Heavy

Extreme
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APPENDIX J
Post Exercise Subjective Questionnaire
This questionnaire is in sections. It is recommended that you read quickly through the
question in each section first, before you answer the question in it. Where options are
given (e.g. Yes/No), please circle your answer and delete the alternatives that do not
apply. It would be appreciated if you can take the time to add details about you answers
and you reasons for them whenever you can.
Participant #__________________________________________
Traffic Samples
1. Did the presence of UAVs lead to any particular problems in handling the traffic in
these samples?
Yes/ No If yes, please give details.
2. Was the amount of traffic in the traffic samples realistic compared to simulations
conducted in ERAU courses?
Yes/No If no, please give details
3. Was the mix of types of traffic in the traffic sample realistic compared to simulations
conducted in ERAU courses?
Yes/No If no, please give details
4. Were the four traffic samples approximately equal in terms of the ease or difficulty of
controlling them as traffic?
Yes/ No If no please give details, as fully as you can, of how the four samples
differed.
Conflicts
1. Were the conflicts between aircraft under normal control realistic?
Yes/No If No, in what ways were they unrealistic?
2. Did you find the behavior of the unmanned aerial aircraft predictable/ unpredictable?
If unpredictable, in what ways were they unpredictable? Or if predictable, in what
ways were they predictable?
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Ergonomics of Simulation workspace
1. Were you ever distracted by the other person participating in the experiment at the
same time as you?
Yes/No If yes, please give details of what distracted you.
2. Was all the information on the displays clearly visible?
Yes/ No If No, please give details
3. Did you understand all the information on the displays?
Yes/ No If no, please give details of any information that you did not understand
4. Was the information encoding used to designate a UAV acceptable to you?
Yes/ No If it was not, what coding to denote UAV would you prefer
5. Did the communication facilities(R/T, phone, etc.) function normally during this
evaluation?
Yes/ No If they did not, what was abnormal about them?
6. Please give any further comments about the ergonomics of the workspace or
comments about any other aspect of the human-machine interface in this experiment.

Workload Contribution was : (circle)
Very Low
Very High
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

1

10

2

3

4

5 6

7 8

9

Workload Factors
# of Aircraft
# of Conflicts
# of route changes
# of altitude changes
# of airspeed changes
Pilot verbal response errors/delay
Pilot route/altitude deviations
Traffic Mix
Confidence in Unmanned aircraft systems
Housekeeping (moving data blocks, using
the intentions info)
A/C flight characteristics (climb, descend,
airspeed)
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1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5

6
6
6
6
6
6
6

7
7
7
7
7
7
7

8
8
8
8
8
8
8

9
9
9
9
9
9
9

10
10
10
10
10
10
10

Monitoring and resolving conflicts
Interpreting the intentions information
Inputting Workload factor on ISA
Console Layout
Monitor size and position
Use pf PC keyboard
Unfamiliarity with procedures

Any Additional Comments
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